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Outlook 
and  
appraisal 
Overview 
 
 
The Scottish economy is poised to come out 
of recession. But there is still uncertainty 
whether the exit will have occurred in the 
fourth quarter of last year as it did in the UK 
economy, all be it weakly. The UK economy 
went into recession one quarter ahead of 
Scotland and it may be that Scotland will 
come out of recession one quarter later than 
the UK. The survey evidence for the final 
quarter  of 2009, which cast some doubt on 
the strength of the recovery, certainly leaves 
that possibility open. 
 
Over the course of the recession total GVA in 
the Scottish economy has fallen by -6.13% 
compared to a slightly smaller contraction of 
-5.73% in the UK. The relative performance 
of the service sector largely accounts for the 
bigger impact of the recession in Scotland. 
Service sector GVA in Scotland fell by  
-4.76% while the contraction in UK services 
amounts to -4.59%. Manufacturing sectors 
have suffered more in the recession both in 
Scotland and the UK. But Scottish 
manufacturing GVA fell by -11.28% during 
the recession, less than the fall of -14.22% in 
UK manufacturing. Construction output has 
fallen by -13.08% in Scotland if the start of 
the sector’s recession is dated as 2008q2, 
which compares with a fall of -14.07% in the 
UK if the start of the sector’s recession is 
dated as 2008q1 to the trough of 2009q1. 
However, there is a good case for arguing 
that the recession, or structural downturn, in 
Scottish construction began after 2006q3, 
which was not mirrored in the UK. The loss 
of output in Scottish construction over this 
longer period amounts to -15.47%. UK 
construction, in contrast, has displayed a 
classic 'V' shape with a sharp and deep 
downturn followed by rapid recovery of 2.5% 
between 2009q1 and 2009q3. 
 
One aspect of the present recession is that 
the labour market outcomes have been 
appreciably different from the impact on 
output.  While Scottish GVA has fallen by  
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-6.13% over the recession, the number of 
employee jobs has fallen by only -2.67%. To 
the extent that it is more easy to cut labour 
hours via short-time working than it once 
was, then employers may be less likely to 
make workers redundant in the short-run.  
Productivity per hour will not drop by as 
much as productivity per worker and coupled 
with lower labour payments competitiveness 
will suffer less.  But it is arguable that a 
flexible labour market also makes it easier to 
dispense with the services of workers. If the 
recession is expected to persist, or the 
recovery expected to be very sluggish, then 
job shedding could pick up and 
unemployment continue to rise. 
 
The UK economy has a large public sector 
financial deficit and rising net debt levels and 
interest payment. The increase is largely a 
consequence of government policy action to 
deal with the recession as households and 
firms sought to adjust to high levels of pre-
recession debt by increasing saving and 
lowering spending. There is a need for a 
sizable adjustment in the UK's fiscal position. 
It is reasonable to argue that the government 
needs to set out in its March Budget a more 
credible and more clearly specified 
programme of fiscal tightening over the next 
five years than it did in the 2009 Pre-Budget 
Report.  
 
Yet, there is much uncertainty about 
household and corporate spending and 
because of this we have for some time urged 
caution about the timing of a fiscal 
consolidation in the UK. The UK and 
Argentina are the only two G-20 countries to 
have withdrawn their fiscal stimulus in 2010. 
The overall fiscal stance in 2010-11 is shown 
by the 2009 Pre-Budget Report to be 
negative. In our view this is dangerous given 
that UK households have the most 
adjustments to make to their balance sheets 
than households in other countries because 
the level of household debt was pre-crisis so 
high here. If the growth of world trade does 
start to pick up appreciably and this is likely 
later this year the UK should benefit 
disproportionately. Then there will be a real 
prospect of what the Bank of England and 
the government desires: a switch to export 
and investment led growth. But until that time 
given relatively flat household and corporate 
spending, a fiscal tightening in 2010, the 
ending of further quantitative easing this 
month, and the likely continuing sluggishness 
of bank lending, increases the risk of a 
double-dip recession this year. 
 
Some commentators have suggested that 
the UK is much the same as Greece in terms 
of risk of default on its debts.  But despite 
some superficial similarities, such as the 
relative size of the budget deficit, the UK 
fiscal position is much stronger. 
Nevertheless, there is a lesson to be learnt 
from the Greek experience and it is this: 
allowing countries/regions within a larger 
monetary union to retain fiscal autonomy 
may threaten the monetary union. It runs the 
risk of a fiscal crisis because the financial 
markets will not discipline fiscal laxity in any 
one country/region sufficiently early enough. 
The discipline needs to come from the 
political centre and that means that complete 
fiscal autonomy is ruled out, although some 
degree of fiscal devolution is clearly feasible.  
 
We are forecasting that Scotland will return 
to positive growth in 2010. But the recovery 
over the year is weak whilst household 
spending strengthens overall it continues to 
fall. Exports to the rest of the world continue 
to recover and at a faster rate than predicted 
in November. This along with some recovery 
of investment, though still negative, helps 
raise the forecast to 0.6% growth compared 
to our prediction of 0.1% in November. 
Recovery is weaker in Scotland than in the 
UK for the reasons that were well rehearsed 
in the previous Commentary and we see no 
basis for altering that view. Scottish GVA 
growth is better than the UK on the High 
growth scenario only. Trend growth is 
realised on our Central scenario in 2012. 
Employee job losses are forecast to continue 
from 2009 into 2010, with a net  96,000 jobs 
lost in those two years and not fully matched 
by job gains of 63,000 in 2011 and 2012. ILO 
unemployment is expected to peak at 
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216,000 or 8.1% this year falling to just under 
186,000 or 7.3% in 2011 and further to 
144,000 or 6.3% in 2012. However, if the 
recent trend in Scottish unemployment 
continues, which we think less likely, the rate 
could rise on our low growth scenario to 
9.9%, or 264,000, this year. 
 
Recent GDP performance 
GDP data for the Scottish economy for the third quarter of 
2009 became available in late January. The Scottish 
economy continued in recession in the third quarter with 
output falling by -0.2% and -4.6% over the year, much the 
same as the UK. But the contraction in quarterly output is 
clearly getting less – see Figure 1. 
 
Scotland’s GDP has therefore contracted by -6.13% over 
the five quarters since the recession began in second 
quarter of 2008. This is a somewhat greater loss of net 
output than the drop in the UK as a whole, which amounts to 
-5.73% over the six quarters from the start of recession in 
the first quarter of 2008. The decline in GDP in Scotland 
continues to mirror the decline in the UK as Figure 1 shows 
but nonetheless, on the data so far, the recession in output 
continues to be slightly more severe here. In the 4
th
 quarter 
2009, the UK economy came out of recession growing by 
0.1%. Scottish GDP figures for the fourth quarter are not 
available until April but the graph above does suggest that 
the economy is moving in the right direction. 
 
In the 3
rd
 quarter 2009 output in the service sector – 
accounting for 74% of overall GVA –  fell by -0.3% in 
Scotland and by -0.2% in UK – see Figure 2. However, 
while the service sector performed less well in Scotland than 
in the UK in the third quarter, manufacturing (14% of GVA) 
did better. Manufacturing GVA rose by 0.8% in Scotland 
against a fall of -0.2% in manufacturing in the UK - see 
Figure 3. 
 
The construction industry in Scotland continued to contract 
with GVA falling by -1.6% in the third quarter compared to 
an increase of 1.9% in the industry in the UK – see Figure 4. 
 
Within services, the main sectoral drivers of contraction in 
the second quarter were hotels & catering (3% of overall 
GVA), real estate & business services (REBS) (18% of 
GVA) and financial services (8% of GVA). Activity in hotels 
& catering fell by -2.3%, compared to a contraction of -2.1% 
in the sector in the UK. This again confirms, perhaps, that 
tourism to Scotland has not benefited by much from the 
decline in value of the pound sterling and by the 
“Homecoming Scotland” events. REBS output fell by -1.5% 
in Scotland compared to a fall of -0.4% in the UK. This 
contrasts with the previous quarter where REBS output rose 
by 0.9% after falling for four successive quarters. Clearly, 
the notion that the recession had ended in this key sector 
was illusory. Financial services contracted by -1.3% in 
Scotland compared to a greater fall of -2.0% in the sector in 
the UK – see Figure 5. On this evidence the recession in 
financial services appears to be easing somewhat in 
Scotland but not so in the UK, although the sector went into 
recession much later in the UK.  
 
Two service sectors experienced positive growth in the third 
quarter: retail & wholesale (11% of GVA), and transport & 
communication (7% of GVA). GVA in transport & 
communication services rose by 0.5% in Scotland, a little 
worse than the 0.7% increase experienced in the UK. Retail 
& wholesale GVA expanded by 1.5%, a little more than the 
1.4%% expansion in the sector in the UK. 
 
The stronger overall performance of Scottish manufacturing 
(0.8%) compared to UK manufacturing (-0.2%) in the third 
quarter was largely down to comparative strength in 4 
sectors: food, drink, metals, paper, printing & publishing. 
Food (1.4% of GVA) grew by 2%, compared to a fall of -
0.7% in the UK. The drinks industry (1.6% of GVA) grew by 
5% compared to growth of 1.5% in the UK where the sector 
is relatively smaller (0.4% of GVA). The metals sector (1% 
of GVA) grew more strongly in Scotland in the quarter, by 
1.6% compared to 0.3% in the UK. This stands in marked 
contrast to its performance in the second quarter when 
output fell by -8.8% in Scotland compared to a fall of -2.9% 
in the UK. Finally, paper, printing & publishing (1.4% of 
GVA) contributed to the overall stronger performance  of 
Scottish manufacturing by growing by 1.6% in the quarter 
while its UK counterpart contracted by -3.6%. Other 
manufacturing (1.7% of GVA) contributed positively to 
overall Scottish manufacturing performance through growth 
of 2.6% but the sector in the UK also grew strongly, by 
2.3%. Refined petroleum products also grew more strongly 
in Scotland, 5.7%, than the sector in the UK, 1.1%. But the 
contribution to better manufacturing performance in 
Scotland was small given its low share of GVA (0.2% of 
GVA). 
 
The chemicals industry continued to display negative growth 
in Scotland but with a drop in output of -0.3% compared to a 
fall of -0.8% in the UK, the significant contraction in output 
experienced in the 3 previous quarters appears to have 
halted. Finally, the engineering industry in Scotland (4.9% of 
GVA) appeared to slip back in the third quarter, with output 
falling by -2.1% compared to a fall of -0.1% in the sector in 
the UK. Within engineering,  all three principal sectors 
experienced negative growth. Electronics (2.9% of GVA) cut 
back production by -3.3% while the sector in the UK 
contracted by only -0.5%. So any hope that the positive 
growth registered by the sector in the second quarter 
heralded the end of recession has been dashed. Mechanical 
engineering reduced its output by -1.4% in the quarter a 
better performance than the contraction of -2.9% 
experienced in the sector in the UK. Finally, transport 
equipment (1% of GVA) saw a further small fall in 
production of -0.1% in Scotland compared to growth of 2.4% 
in the UK.  
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Figure 1:  Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 1998q2 to 2009q3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Scottish and UK Services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2009q3  
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Figure 3:  Scottish and UK manufacturing GVA growth at constant basis prices 1998q2 to 2009q3 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Scottish and UK construction GVA volume growth 1998q2-2009q3 
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Output and employment in the recession 
Figure 6 charts the performance of key Scottish sectors over 
the past 12 years. The chart indicates that almost all of 
these key growth sectors have been affected by the 
recession  with the exception of the public sector. Some 
appear now to be recovering: transport & communication; 
retail & wholesale; other services; and food & drink. But 
there are likely to be set backs just as there was in 
electronics and REBs in the third quarter. 
 
Figure 7 indicates that over the course of the recession total 
GVA in the Scottish economy has fallen by -6.13% 
compared to a slightly smaller contraction of -5.73% in the 
UK. The figure makes clear that it is the relative 
performance of the service sector that largely accounts for 
the bigger impact of the recession in Scotland. Complicating 
this picture is the fact that some sectors began to recover 
sooner in the UK such as construction and in Scotland, such 
as manufacturing and other services. 
 
Service sector GVA in Scotland fell by -4.76% while the 
contraction in UK services amounts to -4.59%. Within 
services, the sectors that performed worst over the 
recession relative to their UK counterparts were: financial 
services (-18.16% in Scotland compared to -6.42% in the 
UK); REBS (-11.60% in Scotland, -6.34% in the UK); and 
hotels & catering (-11.26% in Scotland, -8.81% in the UK). 
In contrast, 3 service sectors did better over the recession 
than their counterparts in the UK: retail & wholesale (-3.80% 
in Scotland, -6.45% in the UK); transport & communication 
(-3.72% in Scotland, -6.93% in the UK); and other services 
(-6.64% in Scotland, -10.06% in the UK).  
 
Construction output has fallen by -13.08% in Scotland if the 
start of the sector’s recession is dated as 2008q2, which 
compares with a fall of -14.07% in the UK if the start of the 
sector’s recession is dated as 2008q1 to the trough of 
2009q1. However, there is a good case for arguing that the 
recession, or structural downturn, in Scottish construction 
began after 2006q3, which was not mirrored in the UK. The 
loss of output in Scottish construction over this longer period 
amounts to -15.47%. UK construction, in contrast, has 
displayed a classic 'V' shape with a sharp and deep 
downturn followed by rapid recovery of 2.5% between 
2009q1 and 2009q3. 
 
Manufacturing sectors have suffered more in the recession 
both in Scotland and the UK. Scottish manufacturing GVA 
fell  by -11.28% during the recession, less than the fall of 
 -14.22% in UK manufacturing. Within manufacturing, 
electronics lost -15.33% of its Scottish GVA but -17.12% of 
its UK GVA in the recession. The chemicals industry in 
Scotland was the biggest affected with GVA dropping by 
 -25.48% in just four quarters compared to the UK where 
GVA fell by -6.49% in six quarters. 
 
As we noted in the previous Commentary these data 
highlight some of the key dimensions of the present 
recession: its roots in the bursting of a commercial property 
and housing bubble and the indirect world-wide 
consequences for trade significantly depressing 
manufacturing output due to the much greater importance of 
export activity in the sector. 
 
One aspect of the present recession is that the labour 
market outcomes have been appreciably different from the 
impact on output.  This is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
What Figure 8 shows is that while Scottish GVA has fallen 
by -6.13% over the recession, the number of employee jobs 
has fallen by only -2.67%. In these circumstances you would 
expect the average productivity of workers to fall. There is 
evidence that this has happened in the UK and that the drop 
in worker productivity parallels the fall in previous UK 
recessions (See Myers 2009, cited in Labour Market 
Review section below.) As that section notes, the 
apparently smaller impact of the recession on jobs than on 
output has been linked to the 'flexible' labour market. There 
is clear evidence that many employers have introduced 
more flexible working, reducing overtime and, to a lesser 
extent, implementing short-time working.  Some of the 
impact of this can now be seen in official statistics, with for 
example, the average weekly hours of work falling in 
Scotland across most categories of employment. So, the 
average for all workers has dropped from 32.2 hours to 32 
hours, a fall of -0.6%, while the average for full-time workers 
has dropped from 36.9 hours to 36.7 hours, a fall of -0.5%.  
 
To the extent that it is more easy to cut labour hours via 
short-time working than it once was, then employers may be 
less likely to make workers redundant in the short-run.  
Productivity per hour will not drop by as much as 
productivity per worker and coupled with lower labour 
payments competitiveness will suffer less.  But it is arguable 
that a flexible labour market also makes it easier to 
dispense with the services of workers. If the recession is 
expected to persist, or the recovery expected to be very 
sluggish, then job shedding could pick up and 
unemployment continue to rise. Moreover, given that many 
workers are now on reduced hours and worker productivity 
low then a recovery in demand for goods and services and 
rising output may be met, initially at least, more by a rise in 
hours worked per worker than an increase in job creation. 
 
Macro policy and the UK and Scottish 
economies 
We hold the view that without the significant injection of 
demand made possible by a monetary and fiscal policy 
expansion, the UK and Scotland, along with the US and 
many other key economies, would in all likelihood have 
experienced a loss of output comparable to that of the Great 
Depression in the 1930s. In the UK the programme of 
monetary expansion, known as quantitative easing, has 
injected around £200 billion into the UK economy.  Yet, as 
the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King,  pointed 
out in his speech at the University of Exeter on 19 January 
2010, the growth in stock of broad money in the UK  
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Figure 5:  Scottish and UK financial services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2009q3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Growth of key sectors in Scotland 1998q2 to 2009q3 
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economy, while positive, is still much below the 5% to 10% 
annual rate of growth experienced in normal circumstances. 
In the United States the growth of money stock is virtually 
static and in Europe it is slightly negative. These figures 
provide an indication of the scale and significance of the 
contraction in bank balance sheets due to the 'credit 
crunch'. Without the programme of quantitative easing the 
monetary squeeze on the UK economy would have been, in 
the Governor's words, 'potentially disastrous'.  
 
Similarly, the fiscal injection has sought to compensate for 
the significant drop in private sector demand for British 
goods and services as households and companies sought 
to reduce their high indebtedness. The most striking 
example of this is the rapid rise in the household saving 
ratio, which is shown in Figure 9. The ratio was negative in 
the first quarter of 2008 (-0.7%) but as recession started to 
bite it rose sharply, so that by in 2009 Q3 it had risen by 7.7 
percentage points above the same quarter a year earlier to 
8.6%. This was, as the Bank of England notes in its 
February Inflation Report: "the largest four-quarter increase 
in the saving ratio since records began in 1955." This 
outcome is further underlined by Figure 10, which shows the 
financial balances of the public, private and foreign sectors 
as a percentage of UK national income since 1955. In 
accounting terms all balances sum to zero. From the figure 
it is clear that the foreign surplus or deficit on UK current 
account has persisted for some time, at least since the late 
1990s. But the big recent movements are the rapid growth 
in the public sector deficit as the private sector balance went 
from negative to positive, paralleling the rise in the 
household saving ratio. The figure shows that much the 
same happened in the early 1990's UK recession. 
 
As a result of this, the UK now has public sector deficit that 
stands at 12.6% of national income and according to IMF 
estimates the structural, or permanent non-cyclical, 
component amounts to 7.8% points. A structural deficit of 
nearly 8% of GDP is clearly unsustainable. UK public sector 
net debt stands currently just under 60% of GDP and with 
present assumptions of GDP growth and likely interest rates 
the net debt position would reach 100% of GDP in 5 or six 
years.  While net debt of 100% of GDP, if stabilised, need 
not be unsustainable, the level of  interest payments on the 
debt will begin to crowd out other public sector expenditure. 
On present policies the 2009 Pre-Budget Report  UK net 
debt is forecast to be around 80% of GDP in 2014-15, which 
as Figure 11 shows is not wholly unusual by historical 
standards. 
 
Figure 11 reveals that for half of the twentieth century net 
debt levels were above 80% of GDP. This of course 
embraces extreme circumstances such as both World Wars 
but those events led to net debt levels considerably above 
100%, which is no way currently in prospect for Britain. 
 
The IMF estimated in November 2009 that on current 
policies UK net interest payments will rise from 1.6% of 
GDP in 2007 to 3.1% in 2014. This is not trivial and would 
amount to around £50 billion per year from £35 billion in 
2009. Yet, the IMF forecasts that 6 of the G-20 countries 
would have a net interest payment share of GDP in 2014 
greater than the UK: Italy (6.2%), India (5.6%), Turkey 
(5.4%), United States (4.5%), Brazil (4.3%) and France 
(3.2%).  The average for all the advanced G-20 countries is 
also forecast to be greater (3.5%). (Greece is not included in 
the analysis). A 3.1% net interest payment share of GDP 
would according to the IMF amount to 8.3% of UK fiscal 
revenues. Figure 12 indicates that net interest payments of 
at least 3% of GDP per annum existed for seventy five years 
between 1916 and 1991, which should put the present crisis 
into context. Some experts argue that it is only when debt 
interest payments rise to 12% of GDP that a government is 
likely to default (see 
http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/debt_brief.php ). This 
may be too high and it seems not unlikely that a default 
could occur before interest payments reached a third of 
fiscal revenues - the likely analogue of 12% of GDP.  
 
In view of this background we believe it is incorrect, as 
some commentators have done, to suggest that the UK is in  
the same category as Greece in terms of risk of default . As 
the BBC's Economics Editor, Stephanie Flanders, has 
pointed out, the fact that the UK has a budget deficit that's 
comparable to Greece is not sufficient to put the UK into the 
same category as Greece. The main differences are: 
 
 the debt to GDP ratio is currently well over 110% in 
Greece and under 60% in the UK; 
 Greek debt servicing costs are now just under 12% 
of GDP, in the current debt costs are under 3% of 
GDP; 
 the average maturity of UK sovereign debt is 14 
years, compared to 4 years in the US, 6 or 7years 
in France and Germany, and in Greece it is even 
lower with 10% of debt maturing in a few months. 
So, despite the size of the UK budget deficit, 
Germany, France and Italy, will all issue absolutely 
more sovereign debt on the markets than the UK in 
2010; 
 Greece has a severe competitiveness problem, 
which the country is unable to address 
independently through a downward exchange rate 
adjustment. The UK current account deficit stands 
at only 2.5% of GDP and we have experienced a 
25% devaluation since before the recession in mid 
2007. Greece has a current account deficit of 11% 
of GDP and no way of addressing this, if it remains 
within the eurozone, other than domestic 
downward adjustment of wages, other costs and 
prices. The UK has a basis for recovery higher 
GDP, higher tax revenues and lower public 
spending on transfer payments, which is denied 
Greece. 
 
The UK is not Greece. But there is a lesson to be learnt 
from the Greek experience and it is this: granting full fiscal 
autonomy to a country/region within a larger monetary union 
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Figure 7:  GVA Change over the recession to Q3 2009 or latest trough 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Output and jobs in the recession 
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runs the risk of a fiscal crisis that can threaten the union 
because the financial markets will not discipline fiscal laxity 
in any one country/region sufficiently early enough. The 
discipline needs to come from the political centre and that 
means that complete fiscal autonomy is ruled out, although  
some degree of fiscal devolution is clearly  feasible.  
 
All of this is not to deny the need for a sizable adjustment in 
the UK's fiscal position. There is a case to argue that the 
government needs to set out in its March Budget a more 
credible and more clearly specified programme of fiscal 
tightening over the next five years than it did in the 2009 
Pre-Budget Report. The IMF points out that removal of a 
structural deficit of the scale present in the UK - just under 
8% of GDP - is not unprecedented. More than 20 advanced 
economies achieved improvements in their structural fiscal  
balances of 5% of GDP or more at least once in the past 40 
years, while 10 countries achieved improvements in excess 
of 10% of GDP in that period. The UK government can and 
must do this. But there is room for debate around timing.  
 
As Andrew Sentance of the Bank of England notes, the 
current  problem of an imbalance between a large private 
surplus on the one hand and a large budget deficit on the 
other, is very similar to the situation that faced the UK in 
1993 after the previous recession. The deficit in 1993 stood 
at 7.8% of GDP and this was reduced to 2% of national 
income in 1997 and a small surplus in 1998. A series of 
budgets raised taxes and restricted public expenditure but 
the process was also helped by reasonable GDP growth of 
3% per annum. A more competitive pound sterling, as now, 
assisted the recovery along with a strong recovery in 
domestic private spending. The principle difference between 
now and then is that private spending is likely to be more 
constrained now due to the legacy of the financial crisis. The 
household sector has had to adjust from the significant 
deficit that emerged in the mid-2000s. It has now moved 
back to balance, as evidenced by the rise in the savings 
ratio noted above. But the question is how much further 
does the sector have to go in building up a financial surplus 
before it starts to raise its spending relative to income 
again? This is  a key difference from the early 1990s when 
households were already in surplus having recovered from a 
move into deficit in the late 1980s. In addition, corporate 
surpluses are bigger than at the end of the 1990s recession 
and there is a question to be raised about how long these 
will be sustained before spending on re-stocking and new 
investment occurs. 
 
It is because of this uncertainty about household and 
corporate spending that we have for some time urged 
caution about the timing of a fiscal consolidation. The UK 
and Argentina are the only two G-20 countries to have 
withdrawn their fiscal stimulus in 2010. The UK will still 
benefit from the effects of the automatic stabilisers but the 
overall fiscal stance in 2010-11 is shown by the 2009 Pre-
Budget Report to be negative. In our view this is dangerous 
given that UK households have the most adjustments to 
make to their balance sheets than households in other 
countries because the level of household debt was pre-crisis 
so high here. If the growth of world trade does start to pick 
up appreciably and this is likely later this year the UK should 
benefit disproportionately. Then there will be a real prospect 
of what the Bank of England and the government desires: a 
switch to export and investment led growth. But until that 
time given relatively flat household and corporate spending, 
a fiscal tightening in 2010, the ending of further quantitative 
easing this month, and the likely continuing sluggishness of 
bank lending, increases the risk of a double-dip recession 
this year. 
 
 
Forecasts 
The underlying economic situation has not changed 
significantly since we last reported in late November 2009. 
The UK economy crept out of recession in 2009q4. Scottish 
outturn data for the fourth quarter will not be available until 
April, so we must rely on surveys for information on the 
most recent performance.  
 
The Review of Business Surveys section makes clear that 
the Scottish economy is in a better position than it was a 
year ago. But the review also makes clear that business 
sales and optimism trends in the fourth quarter were not as 
strong as the third quarter. There is concern that the 
Scottish economy faltered in the fourth quarter and this 
concern has carried over into the first quarter of this year 
with weaker retail sales data than south of the border, and 
unemployment, in the latest data for the final quarter of last 
year, rising at a faster rate, not only than the rest of the UK, 
but also western Europe. Mixed messages are also coming 
from the housing market with both the Lloyds TSB Scotland 
and Halifax Bank of Scotland producing surveys indicating 
falling Scottish house prices: -6.8% in the quarter to the end 
of January compared with a year before in the former, and  
-7% over the year to the end of December, nearly agrees, in 
the latter. In contrast, the UK Department of Communities 
and (English) Local Government announced on the same 
day that Scottish prices in the year to the end of December 
had risen by 3.8%. 
 
None of this bodes well for the growth of Scottish household 
spending, which accounts for 42% of Scottish final demand. 
It is likely, however, that the Scottish Retail Consortium data 
for January are much influenced by one-off events such as 
the reinstatement of the temporary reduction in VAT at the 
end of the year, which may have led to some spending 
being brought forward. Moreover, the poor weather after 
Christmas in the New Year may have curtailed spending in 
January. But with weak house prices, rising unemployment 
and many households still seeking to adjust their personal 
balance sheets through higher saving, it seems unlikely that 
there will be much revival in spending in the first quarter of 
this year and perhaps the second quarter as well. We have 
noted that public spending will begin to tighten this year, 
although it is not predicted to begin falling until 2011. 
Investment looks to be weak, although some improvement 
in investment trends was noted in the latest Scottish 
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Figure 9:  UK household savings ratio 2008q1 to 2009q3 (% of household income) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  UK financial imbalances since 1955 – percent of national income 
 
 
Source:  Andrew Sentence speech, November 2009, Bank of England 
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Figure 11:  UK net debt to GDP 1900 to 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  UK debt interest to GDP 1900 to 2011 
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Chambers’ Business Survey (SCBS) but not in the CBI and 
Scottish Engineering surveys. However, there is stronger 
evidence that exports are beginning to pick up.  In the latest 
Scottish business survey  rising trends in export orders are 
observed, although in the SCBS the trend was weaker in the 
fourth quarter than in the third quarter 0f 2009. 
 
Our latest forecasts for the Scottish economy have been 
prepared against the economic and policy background 
considered above and discussed in considerable detail 
along with the forecasts in the section on Forecasts of the 
Scottish Economy below. 
Given the continuing climate of uncertainty and the 
significant data revisions to both Scottish and First Release 
UK data, we adopt the practice of recent Fraser Economic 
Commentaries and present three alternative scenarios for 
growth, employment and unemployment in the Scottish 
economy: we label the scenario that we feel is most likely 
“central”, with “high growth” and “low growth” as two 
respectively upper and lower growth alternatives. The 
“central” scenario is that which is most likely, while the “high 
growth” and “low growth” scenarios reveal the range of 
possible outcomes for the Scottish economy foreseen for 
future developments from 2009 through 2010 to 2012. 
 
 
GVA Forecasts 
 
Table 1: Forecast Scottish GVA Growth in Three Scenarios, 2009-2012  
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 2009 2010 2011 2012 
     
High growth -4.7 1.7 2.2 2.8 
November forecast -4.9 1.6 1.8 2.1 
Central -4.8 0.6 1.6 2.2 
November forecast -5.0 0.1 1.1 1.6 
Low growth -4.9 -0.7 -0.3 0.8 
November forecast -5.2 -0.7 -0.1 0.5 
 
 
Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2009-2012 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
     
High growth -60,488 -9,785 30,253 57,213 
June forecast -62,827 -23,152 33,584 45,174 
Central  -64,218 -32,264 18,277 44,612 
June forecast  -84,399 -51,451 11,301 26,824 
Low growth -77,861 -57,002 -16,538 13,631 
June forecast 103,579 -66,894 -3,722 6,847 
 
 
Table 3: ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the three forecast 
scenarios 
 
 2009      2010 2011 2012 
ILO unemployment rate 
High growth 7.6%      7.3% 5.6% 3.6% 
Central 7.6%      8.1% 7.3% 6.3% 
Numbers 200,082 216,200 185,700 144,200 
Low growth 7.6% 9.9% 10.1% 9.8% 
     
Claimant count rate 
High growth 4.9% 4.4% 3.4% 2.4% 
Central 4.9% 5.4% 4.6% 3.7% 
Numbers 136,821 148,000 127,000 99,000 
Low growth 4.9% 6.8% 7.0% 6.7% 
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The key forecasts are summarised in Table 1 along with 
our November forecasts for comparison. We shall 
primarily focus on our central forecast here. It is clear that 
we have revised upwards slightly our GVA forecast for 
2009 to 
 -4.8%. The narrow gap between the forecasts on the 
three scenarios for 2009 is mainly due to the fact that we 
already have three of the four quarters of outturn data. 
Scotland is forecast to return to positive growth in 2010. 
But the recovery over the year is weak, household 
spending strengthens but continues to fall. Exports to the 
rest of the world continue to recover and at a faster rate 
than predicted in November. This along with some 
recovery of investment, though still negative, helps raise 
the forecast to 0.6% growth compared to our prediction of 
0.1% in November. Recovery is weaker in Scotland than 
in the UK for the reasons that were well rehearsed in the 
previous Commentary and we see no basis for altering 
that view. Scottish GVA growth is better than the UK on 
the High growth scenario only. Trend growth is realised on 
our Central scenario in 2012. 
 
Employment Forecasts 
The key forecasts are summarised in Table 2. Employee 
job losses continue from 2009 into 2010, with a net 96,000 
jobs lost in those two years and not fully matched by job 
gains of 63,000 in 2011 and 2012. At the sectoral level, 
services experiences the greatest decline in jobs in 2009 
and 2010 with 42,000 net jobs lost. Job losses in financial 
services accounts for 16,500 of the service sector job 
losses. Construction job losses amount to nearly 27,000 
over the two years and as with services the number of 
construction jobs in 2012 remains below 2008 levels but 
there is recovery in 2011 and 2012 of more than 3,000 
jobs. Finally, the production sector which principally 
includes manufacturing sheds more than 17,000 jobs in 
2009 and 2010 but through strong export growth net job 
creation in 2011 and 2012 of 26,000. 
 
Unemployment Forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in 
Table 3 above. On our Central forecast  ILO 
unemployment is expected to peak at 216,000 or 8.1% 
this year falling to just under 186,000 or 7.3% in 2011 and 
further to 144,000 or 6.3% in 2012. However, if the recent 
trend in Scottish unemployment continues, which we think 
less likely, the rate could rise on our low growth scenario 
to 9.9%, or 264,000, this year, reaching a rate peak of 
10.1%, or 257,000, in 2011 and then falling to 9.8%, or 
224,000, in 2012. 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
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